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CASE NOTES

PAYMENT-Prepayment Penalties-Imposition of Penalty
Must be Caused by Prepayment
Goldman v. First FederalSavings & Loan Association,
518 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1975).
In March 1966, Michael and Judith Goldman secured a home mortgage
loan from the First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Wilmette, Illinois.
The promissory note provided for equal installment payments payable on the
fifth day of each month. The interest paid under each installment was for
the use of the principal in the month in which payment was made. On June
5, 1973, the Goldmans made their regular monthly payment; on June 21, they
retired the loan by paying First Federal the entire balance due. Upon
receipt of a $25 fee, First Federal cancelled the note and released the
mortgage.
The Goldmans noted that the June 5 installment included an interest
payment for an entire month, and filed a class action seeking a refund of the
interest paid for the period of June 22 through July 4, 1973. They
contended that the retention of that interest was a prepayment penalty, and
therefore violated a regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.1 The
district court found that First Federal had exacted such a penalty, and held
for the Goldmans. 2 First Federal appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. Held-Reversed. Where contract terms by their nature
result in the exaction of some unearned interest when the final payment is
made, retention of such unearned interest following a borrower's voluntary
early retirement of a loan does not constitute a prepayment penalty. A true
prepayment penalty is exacted only when the imposition of the charge is
3
caused by prepayment.
"Prepayment" of a loan is its payment in advance of the contract maturity
date.4 At common law, it was not favored; a creditor could not be
compelled to accept payment before it was due. 5 Installments of a debt
payable periodically at fixed dates could not be paid before their due dates
1. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-12(b) (1975).
2. Goldman v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 883 (N.D. Ill. 1974),
rev'd, 518 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1975).
3. Goldman v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 518 F.2d 1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1975).
4. See Chapp v. Peterson, 397 P.2d 5, 8 (Nev. 1964); Feldman v. King's Highway
Say. Bank, 102 N.Y.S.2d 306, 307 (App. Div. 1951) (on loan under whose terms final
payment was due in April 1959, payment of entire balance of debt in March 1950 held a
prepayment); Peryer v. Pennock, 115 A. 105 (Vt. 1921).
5. Hanson v. Fox, 99 P. 489, 490 (Cal. 1909); Dugan v. Grzybowski, 332 A.2d 97,
99 (Conn. 1973); Fowler v. Courtemanche, 274 P.2d 258, 270 (Ore. 1954); see
Westminster Inv. Corp. v. Equitable Assur. Soc., 443 F.2d 653, 657 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
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without the creditor's consent to such prepayment. 6 This principle is the
corollary of the rule that a debtor cannot be compelled to tender payment
7
before it is due.
The creditor could, of course, agree to the debtor's request to prepay, and
by doing so, create a new, separate contract, a contract providing for the
premature termination of the debt." The consideration for this new contract
was a payment made by the debtor in exchange for his creditor's release of
the right to collect that interest which the debt would have earned had the
prepayment not been made. 9 The payment made by the borrower was
called a "prepayment penalty" or a "prepayment charge," that is, a charge
the creditor imposed on the debtor for the privilege of prematurely retiring
an indebtedness in part or in whole. 10
Despite numerous decisions upholding their legality, prepayment penalties
have been regarded as undesirable by some courts." -It has been asserted
that though a creditor has the right to impose prepayment penalties, such
conduct is "not liberal or praiseworthy.' 1 2 Moreover, one court has indicated that prepayment penalties are appropriate only in situations in which the
note is intended to secure a regular investment income to the lender, and not
where the note is given as security for the timely repayment of the loan,
since the object of the latter is best fulfilled by allowing prepayment without
penalty.13 Because of such considerations, several regulations and statutes,
6. McCarty v. Mellinkoff, 4 P.2d 595, 596 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Atlantic

Life Ins. Co. v. Wolf, 54 A.2d 641, 643 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1947); Ebersole v.
Redding, 22 Ind. 232 (1864).
7. Hanson v. Fox, 99 P. 489, 490 (Cal. 1909) (rights of parties are determined by
their contract, and neither can put the other in default by attempting to vary terms).
8. E.g., McCarty v. Mellinkoff, 4 P.2d 595, 596 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931);
Feldman v. King's Highway Sav. Bank, 102 N.Y.S.2d 306, 307 (App. Div. 1951);
Reichwein v. Kirshenbaum, 201 A.2d 918, 920 (R.I. 1964).
9. McCarty v. Mellinkoff, 4 P.2d 595, 596 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931); see Shalit v.
Investors' Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 244 A.2d 151, 153 (N.J. Super. 1968); Smithwick v.
Whitley, 67 S.E. 914, 915 (N.C. 1910); Reichwein v. Kirshenbaum, 201 A.2d 918, 920
(R.I. 1964). Since the money paid by the borrower is consideration and not interest, it
has been repeatedly held that a transaction otherwise free from usury is not rendered
usurious by the collection of such charges. E.g., Shalit v. Investors' Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
244 A.2d 151, 153 (N.J. Super. 1968); Bell Bakeries v. Jefferson Standard Ins. Co., 96
S.E.2d 408, 415 (N.C. 1957); Reichwein v. Kirshenbaum, 201 A.2d 918, 920 (R.I.
1964). But see General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1265, 1267
(1956); Rev. Rul. 57-198, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 94 (for federal tax purposes prepayment
penalties are interest).
10. See, e.g., Feldman v. King's Highway Say. Bank, 102 N.Y.S.2d 306, 307 (App.
Div. 1951); Reichwein v. Kirshenbaum, 201 A.2d 918, 920 (R.I. 1964); Gulf Coast Inv.
Corp. v. Pritchard, 438 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
11. See Associated Schools, Inc. v. Dade County, 209 So. 2d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1968); Smithwick v. Whitley, 67 S.E. 914, 915 (N.C. 1910).
12. Smithwick v. Whitley, 67 S.E. 914, 915 (N.C. 1910); Barclay v. Walmsley, 102
Eng. Rep. 750, 751 (K.B. 1803).
13. See Dugan v. Grzybowski, 332 A.2d 97, 99 n.2 (Conn. 1973).
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both state and federal, have been enacted either abolishing or greatly
4
curtailing the use of prepayment penalties.'
Prepayment penalties may be imposed in one of two forms. Normally,
the creditor exacts a new, additional charge, but it is also possible that the
creditor retain money given to him which he would otherwise be required to
restore to the borrower. 15 The latter form is typically imposed by retaining
prepaid interest.
Prepaid or advance interest is that taken prior to the expiration of the
proportionate part of the entire loan that is represented by the amount of
interest taken.'
It is a legal and valid contractual alternative to the normal
situation in which interest is paid only after it has accrued.' 7 If the interest
is to be paid in advance, the period for which prepayment is made may be
varied according to the parties' wishes. Interest due during the full term of
the loan may be exacted at the time the loan is made."" Alternatively, the
parties may agree merely to exact interest in advance of given periods in the
term of the loan. 19
In Goldman v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,20 the issue which
faced the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was whether prepayment
of a loan had converted prepaid interest into a prepayment penalty. There
was no question that the system of payments set out in the parties' contract
14. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(6) (1975) (creditor must disclose any prepayment penalties that may be imposed, and explain how penalty will be computed); 12
C.F.R. § 545.6-12(b) (1975) (savings and loan associations may not charge prepayment
penalties on home mortgage loans absent express agreement by parties to the contrary);
UNIFORM CONSUMER CRErr CODE §§ 2.209, 3.209 (buyer may prepay in full without
penalty).
15. Some courts have held that prepayment penalties represent a new additional
charge. Hamilton v. Kentucky Title Say. Bank & Trust Co., 167 S.W. 898, 899 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1914); Feldman v. King's Highway Say. Bank, 102 N.Y.S.2d 306, 307 (App. Div.
1951); Redmond v. Ninth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 147 N.Y.S.2d 702, 703 (Sup. Ct.
1955). An example of the latter class, retention of money which should be restored to
the borrower, is found in Scott v. Liberty Fin. Co., 380 F. Supp. 475 (D.Neb. 1974),
where the court held that the lender must disclose the existence of a prepayment penalty
under 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(6) (1975).
16. Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 630, 633 (1958). Examples of the exaction of advance
interest are found in the following cases: Lustgarten v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 191
N.E.2d 434, 436 (Ill. Ct. App. 1963); Bramblett v. Deposit Bank, 92 S.W. 283, 284 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1906).
17. E.g., Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 141 U.S. 384, 399-400 (1891); Owens v.
Graetzel, 126 A. 224, 227 (Md. Ct. App. 1924); Johnson v. Groce, 179 S.E. 39, 40 (S.C.
1935).
18. This practice is termed "discounting." E.g., Fleckner v. Bank, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 338, 350-51 (1823); Youngblood v. Birmingham Trust & Say. Co., 12 So. 579
(Ala. 1892).
19. Lustgarten v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 191 N.E.2d 434, 436 (Il1. Ct. App.
1963) (interest payable in advance monthly); Rose v. Munford, 54 N.W. 129, 130 (Neb.
1893) (interest paid in advance annually on long-term loan).
20. 518 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1975).
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constituted the advance payment of interest under Illinois law, 21 nor was
there any question that the Goldmans had paid interest for the entire month
of June. The problem was that they had used the principal for only the first
21 days of the month, and that First Federal had refused to return the pro
rata portion of the June installment payment attributable to the last nine
days. 22 This non-refunded portion of the June interest payment was
characterized by the Goldmans and the district court as unearned or usurious
interest, and since it had accrued to the defendant at the time of prepay23
ment, as a prepayment penalty.
The problem with this conclusion, however, is that it incorporates a fallacy.
Assuming that the retention of the interest constitutes some type of penalty,
it does not follow from its appearance at the time of prepayment that it is a
prepayment penalty. The Goldmans were not aware of the penalty until
they prepaid, but such a temporal connection between the two events does
not establish a causal one. It is entirely possible that the exaction of a
penalty may coincide with prepayment and yet not be caused by it.
This principle, temporal but not causal connection, is readily demonstrated
by the Goldmans' payment of the deed release fee at the time of prepayment. This was a $25 charge given to First Federal for the clerical and
administrative expenses of cancelling the note and the mortgage. 24 This fee
was paid, of course, because the final payment had been made. It is
insignificant that the final payment was also a prepayment; the fee would
have been required upon final payment irrespective of whether the note was
retired early or at maturity. Even though this fee was paid at the time of
prepayment, it was not a "prepayment charge," for although the fee was
incurred at the time of prepayment, it was not incurred because of prepay25
ment.
The exaction of "unearned" or "usurious" interest at the time of prepayment is analogous. Under the terms of the loan contract, the Goldmans
21. Joliet Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Bloomington Loan Co., 265 N.E.2d 400, 403

(Ill. Ct. App. 1970) (system of payments does not violate public policy); Lustgarten v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 191 N.E.2d 434, 436 (Ill. Ct. App. 1963) (constituted

advance, not accrued, interest).

22. The Goldmans sued for refund on the 13 day period, June 22 through July 4.
This was incorrect since under the terms of the loan, interest accrued on the first day of
each month, at the rate of one-twelfth of the annual rate calculated upon the unpaid

balance of the loan as of the last day of the preceding month. Interest was paid from
the first of one month to the first of the next month, and not from the fifth to the fifth.
Goldman v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 518 F.2d 1247, 1250 n.5 (7th Cir. 1975).

23. The district court held the interest was unearned because it was interest for a

period of time during which no loan balance was outstanding, and held it to be usurious

because it raised the interest rate for the month of June over the rate provided in the
note. Goldman v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 883, 886 (N.D. Ill. 1974),

rev'd, 518 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1975); see Goldman v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 518
F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1975).
24. Goldman v. First Fed. Sav. &Loan Ass'n, 518 F.2d 1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1975).
25. id. at 1252.
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would make their final payment on the fifth day of the month. That
payment would include interest for the balance of the month, yet by
definition, since the payment is the final one, the note would have been paid
in its entirety, and the interest attributable to the period of the sixth day
through the 30th day would not be earned. Thus, unearned or usurious
interest would be included in the final payment, even though that final
payment was not a prepayment. 26 The penalty would be incurred not
because of prepayment, but simply because of final payment. Since there is
no causal connection between the penalty and the prepayment, it would be
illogical to describe it as a prepayment penalty.
To insure that no such unsound reasoning is used in determining whether
a charge exacted from a debtor is a prepayment penalty, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit set out a test in Goldman which establishes
the primacy of causal connection. To be classified as a prepayment penalty,
the charge imposed at the time of prepayment must be one that would not
have been imposed but for the prepayment. In each case, the court must
ask what caused the penalty to be imposed. 27 In Goldman, the imposition
of the penalty did not result from prepayment; rather, it was an inherent
feature of the contract terms. It follows, therefore, that although First
Federal's retention of the unearned interest may have been some type of
penalty it was not a prepayment penalty.
It must be emphasized that it is the cause of the imposition, and not the
form of the penalty, that is determinative under the Goldman test.28 For
example, the retention of prepaid unearned interest, the penalty imposed
upon the Goldmans, may constitute a prepayment penalty, provided the
penalty is incurred because of prepayment. In Scott v. Liberty Finance
Co.2 9 it was held that the retention of unearned interest following the early
retirement of a discounted loan constituted a prepayment penalty.30 The
Goldman test supports that result. The penalty in Scott occurred because
the note was prepaid; had the note been paid according to the contract
schedule there would have been no penalty.3 ' It is not significant that the
26. The Seventh Circuit's illustration clarifies this point:
Assume that the regular monthly payment on April 5, 1986, would reduce the
principal balance to $100. Under the terms of the note, on May 1, 1986, an interest charge of 46 cents (/ of $5.50) would be added to the principal. Then, if on
May 5, 1986, the borrower made a final payment of $100.46, that payment would
include interest for the balance of May, even though during the period between
May 5 and May 31 the note would have been paid in full, and interest attributable
to that period would never be earned. Moreover, the retention of the entire 46
cents would create a true interest cost for the first few days in May of well over

5%%.

Id. at
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

1252.
Id. at 1252.
Id. at 1252.
380 F. Supp. 475 (D. Neb. 1974).
Id. at 479.
See id. at 481 (appendix C).
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penalty itself consists of retained unearned interest as opposed to the
exaction of a wholly new, additional charge.8 2 ,If the penalty is imposed
because of prepayment, it is a prepayment penalty.
Although Goldman held that a purely causal test is to be applied in
determining whether a prepayment penalty has been charged, dicta indicated
that the court's understanding of the use of the term in the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board's regulation is more restricted. 38 Retention of money, as
in Goldman and Scott, was said not to constitute a prepayment penalty under
that regulation. Rather, the regulation was said to be aimed exclusively at
controlling the practice of exacting an additional charge in exchange for the
privilege of prepaying a loan. The court justified this position by asserting
that the regulation is concerned with the type of agreement the parties may
make.8 4 This was not explained, but presumably it means that the regulation is only concerned with prepayment penalties which are anticipated by
the parties at the time the contract is made, and not with those, such as First
Federal's -retention of the unearned interest, which were not foreseen.
Whether such a limitation is correct depends largely upon the intent and
purpose of the regulation. Although no court appears to have resolved the
question, it seems that the purpose of the regulation is to circumscribe a
practice which is deemed onerous and unfair to the borrower.3 5 If that is
so, then the limitation would appear to be correct. No administrative
regulation would be required to protect the borrower whose funds are
improperly withheld since the common law remedies of breach of contract
and restitution afford ample relief. Regulation is appropriate to the exaction
of additional charges, however, since the common law provides no protection
from this practice. Manifestly, construction of a restrictive regulation should
30
limit its operation to the evil it seeks to prevent.
The argument in favor of limitation is supported by the scheme of the
section of the Code of Federal Regulations in which the regulation appears.3 7 Composed of 25 regulations, that section deals with real estate
loans, and as Goldman indicates, is specifically concerned with the types of
loans which are allowable and with their terms.3 8 The section seeks to
regulate the bargain reached by the borrower and the lender, and as such, is
not concerned with events, unforeseen at the time the loan was made, which
32. Goldman v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 518 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1975).
33. Id. at 1252 n.10.
34. Id. at 1252 n.10.

35. See Smithwick v. Whitley, 67 S.E. 914, 915 (N.C. 1910); Barclay v. Walmsley,

102 Eng. Rep. 750, 751 (K.B. 1803).
36. C.f. United States v. Champlin Ref. Co., 341 U.S. 290, 297 (1951); Tallios v.
Tallios, 112 N.E.2d 723, 725 (I11.Ct. App. 1953).
37. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6 through § 545.6-25 (1975).
38. Goldman v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 518 F.2d 1247, 1252 n.10 (7th Cir.
1975).
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may arise in the course of performance. The retention of unearned interest
falls into this latter category. Further, the ceiling the regulation places on
the prepayment penalty to which the parties may agree indicates an intent to
limit the scope of the regulation to the exaction of additional charges. The
regulation does not contemplate withholding funds already paid, but rather
permits a charge of up to six months interest on that part of the prepayment
3 9
which exceeds 20 percent of the original principal amount.
It is possible, however, that the purpose of the regulation is not the control
of an undesirable practice, but instead, the encouragement of repaying the
loan. 40 If that is true, then the limitation suggested in Goldman makes little
sense. ,Both forms of prepayment penalty, exaction of an additional charge
and retention of unearned interest, operate to discourage repayment. As the
opinion in Goldman indicates, both forms are undoubtedly penalties, 41 and
to the extent that they penalize the borrower for repaying, they dissuade him
from doing so. It would be self-defeating to attempt to encourage repayment by prohibiting one practice which discourages it, yet allowing another
to go unchecked.
Any discussion of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's purpose in
issuing the regulation is, however, merely speculative. It is not part of the
holding in Goldman. The actual holding of the case is that a prepayment
penalty is imposed only when the imposition of the penalty is caused by
prepayment, and irrespective of the validity of the court's argument for a
limited interpretation of the regulation, that holding is sound. By accurately
defining the circumstances under which prepayment penalties can arise,
Goldman prevents a possible abuse of the statutes and regulations which
control prepayment penalties. It prevents a party from invoking the sanctions of -those laws in situations in which they do not apply. Application
of the definition in Goldman will insure that other penalties are not mistaken for prepayment penalties. If that is accomplished, the result will be
clarification of the true remedies available to a party.
George H. Spencer, Jr.
39. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-12(b) (1975); see Arnoff v. Western Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n,

470 P.2d 889, 891 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
40. See Dugan v. Grzybowski, 332 A.2d 97, 99 n.2 (Conn. 1973) (clause in note

which permits prepayment without penalty encourages prepayment).
41. Goldman v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 518 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1975).
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